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SEX AS CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE: NORTH
CAROLINA'S NEED FOR A PUTATIVE FATHER
REGISTRY
LISA ALUMBAUGH KAMARCHIK*

I.

INTRODUCTION

'

If this scheme were likely to omit many responsible fathers, and if
qualification for notice were beyond the control of an interested
putative father, it might be thought procedurally inadequate.24
In the seminal United States Supreme Court case of Lehr v. Robertson,
Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for the majority, refused to set aside the
adoption of a child where a father, Lehr, knew about the existence of his
child but neglected to register with New York's putative father registry. 22
Registering with the state putative father registry would have guaranteed that
he received notice and opportunity to contest any future adoption of his
child.2 4 While the mother in Lehr concealed the whereabouts of the child
after she was discharged from the hospital, the mother never hid the fact that
she was pregnant and even told Lehr he was the father. 2 ' Would the outcome
have been different if the mother had also hidden the pregnancy and birth
from Lehr? In North Carolina the answer is a troubling and resounding "no."
North Carolina has no mechanism by which an unwed father may
unilaterally preserve, independent of a mother's deceptive conduct, his right
to notice and opportunity in an adoption action.24 Under the current statutory
adoption scheme, a putative father must take action to "grasp the
opportunity" 2 " to develop a relationship with his child, but his reasonable
ability to take such action hinges first on the knowledge of the pregnancy or
existence of the child. This makes North Carolina's current adoption scheme,
as applied to putative fathers who have been deceived as to the existence of
their children, in the words of Justice Stevens, "procedurally inadequate."
Putative fathers in North Carolina need a mechanism that is actually
within their control in order to "grasp the parental relationship" with their
children when mothers have hidden the facts of their pregnancies and births
from them.

Lisa Alumbaugh Kamarchik is an Assistant Professor of Law in the Legal Writing Program at
North Carolina Central University School of Law. The author would like to thank Peter Kamarchik,
Deborah Sandlin, Lydia Lavelle, and her legal writing colleagues for their support, encouragement,
and guidance. She thanks the editors of the NCCU Law Review for their hard work. The author is
most grateful to Jonathan McGirt, whose appellate passion and expertise are rivaled only by his

skill in origami.
241. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 263-64 (1983).
242. Id. at 264.
243. Id. at 249.
244. Id. at 269.
245. North Carolina has no putative father registry. See generally Chapters 7B and 48-50A of
the NORTH CAROLINA GENERAL STATUTES; Dale Joseph Gilsinger, Annotation, Requirements and
Effects of Putative FatherRegistries, 28 A.L.R.6th 349 (2019); U.S. Dep't. of Health & Hum.
Servs., The Rights of UnmarriedFathers, CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY 3 (current through
August 2017), https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/putative.pdf.
246. Quoted expression is from Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262.
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"Sex is notice" - the grounds upon which many states deny a putative
father notice and opportunity to contest an adoption - should not be the
measure for whether a putative father gets a chance to have a relationship
with his child in cases where the mother has committed fraud. Further, as
suggested by Lehr, a putative father's opportunity to grasp a parental
relationship is constitutionally-mandated,24 ' and the North Carolina
legislature should implement a putative father registry to give effect to the
constitutional mandate. A carefully crafted putative father registry would
give putative fathers a unilateral, affirmative act they can perform to ensure
that they receive notice and opportunity to participate in any subsequent
adoption of their putative children, regardless of a mother's deceptive acts.
II. SCOPE OF ARTICLE
Throughout this article, the term "putative father" is used to refer to
men who have conceived children with women to whom they are not
married. This article specifically addresses putative fathers who have been
deceived as to the existence of their children, resulting in their children being
placed for adoption without their knowledge, as the population in need.
Moreover, because this article is concerned primarily with the constitutional
ramifications of denying putative fathers their constitutionally protected
opportunity to develop parent-child relationships with their offspring, as
endorsed by North Carolina's current adoption scheme, a putative father's
statutory avenues to establish paternity and legitimation of his child are
outside the scope of this article.
Where a mother has deceived a father as to the existence of the
pregnancy and birth (either by affirmatively lying or lying by omission), and
then placed the child for adoption without the father's knowledge, a putative
father will not have the knowledge or incentive to establish paternity or
petition for legitimation. The primary purpose for establishing paternity of a
child born out of wedlock is to allow for the enforcement of the father's duty
to support the child, not for establishing the putative father's constitutionally
248
Similarly ineffective, a
protected status as a legal or physical custodian.
petition for legitimation entitles a putative father to notice and opportunity
to contest an adoption if, and only if, it was filed before the adoption petition,
which likewise cannot protect fathers who do not discover the existence of
249
their progeny until after the adoption has commenced.
Instead, the focus here is in on the constitutional violation created by
having an adoption scheme that does nothing to safeguard a putative father's
opportunity to establish a parental relationship when he has been lied to
about the existence of his child. This population of unfortunate fathers could
be protected with the promulgation of a putative father registry, together with
some minor revisions to the current adoption code. Lest one think that this
247. Id. at 262.

248. 3 Suzanne Reynolds, LEE's NORTH CAROLINA FAMILY LAW 16-21 (5th ed. 2002).
249. Id. at 16-99.
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol42/iss2/4
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population is too small to need protection, consider the number of deceived
fathers who have had the resources to appeal adverse decisions to the
appellate courts of North Carolina, and reasonably surmise that there are
many more who have not had the means to object at all.25 0
III. CURRENT STATUTORY

SCHEMES

In illustrating the lack of safeguards for putative fathers in the current
adoption scheme, it is helpful to highlight the differences between the state's
adoption statutes and the state's termination of parental rights statutes.5 1
Although they have the same legal effect of terminating a parent's legal and
physical rights to his child, North Carolina's adoption and termination
statutes are substantially different.25 2 Crucially, the statutory scheme for
adoption unjustifiably provides less safeguards for a parent's rights than the
statutory scheme for termination.
First, a parent's failure to timely respond to a termination petition may
result in termination only after the court orders a hearing on the petition.2s
In contrast, a parent's failure to timely respond to a notice of adoption results
in a perfunctory determination that his consent to the adoption is not
necessary and that the adoption may proceed without further notice to him. 54
Second, in a termination proceeding, a parent has the right to counsel
and the right to be appointed counsel in cases of indigence. 2 5 The court may
appoint a guardian ad litem for the parent if the parent is incompetent, has
diminished capacity, cannot adequately act in his own interest, or is an
unmarried, unemancipated minor himself.2s' None of these benefits inure to
a parent in an adoption proceeding.
Third, in termination proceedings, the burden is upon the movant to
prove the facts justifying termination by clear and convincing evidence. 25 7 In
an adoption proceeding, a putative father has the burden to prove that his
consent is necessary before he can challenge the adoption.25 8 Specifically, he

250. E.g., A Child's Hope, LLC v. Doe, 630 S.E.2d 673 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006); In re Adoption
of S.D.W., 758 S.E.2d 374 (N.C. 2014); In re Baby Girl Dockery, 495 S.E.2d 417 (N.C. Ct. App.
1998); In re Adoption of Clark, 381 S.E.2d 835 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989), rev'd, 393 S.E.2d 791 (N.C.
1990); Matter of Adoption of P.E.P., 407 S.E.2d 505 (N.C. 1991); In re M.M., 684 S.E.2d 463
(N.C. Ct. App. 2009) (termination); In re T.L.B., 605 S.E.2d 249 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004)
(termination).
251. See Chapters 48 and 7B of the NORTH CAROLINA GENERAL STATUTES, respectively.
252. Portions of the discussion in this section are adapted from this author's contribution to
Respondent-Appellee's New Brief at 68-74, In re Adoption of S.D.W., 758 S.E.2d 374 (N.C. 2014)
(No. 348PA13). The author is grateful to Respondent's appellate counsel, Jonathan McGirt, for the
opportunity to aid the honest cause of Mr. Johns and other fathers like him.
253. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-1107 (2017).
254. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-3-603(a)(7), § 48-2-207(a) (2017).
255. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-1101.1(a) (2017).
256. Id. § 7B-1101.1(b).
257. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-111 l(b) (2017).
258.
N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 48-3-601(b)
(2017).
Published by
History
and Scholarship
Digital
Archives, 2020
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must prove that he has met at least one of the statutory prongs of Section 483-601 discussed below. 2 9
Fourth, the actions that a parent must perform to preclude termination
are less onerous than those required to preclude adoption. In terminations,
termination will not be granted if a putative father has: (1) established

paternity judicially or by affidavit; (2) legitimated the child; (3) filed a
petition for legitimation; (4) married the mother of the child; or (5) provided
"substantial financial support or consistent care" with respect to the child
and mother. 2 60
In adoptions, pursuant to Section 48-3-601, a father's consent for
adoption is required if he:
is or was married to the mother at the time of the child's
(1)
probable conception;
had a marriage solemnized in apparent compliance with the
(2)
law to the mother at the time of the child's probable
conception;
legitimated the child prior to the filing of the adoption
(3)
petition;

(4)

received the child into his home and openly held the child

out as his own prior to the petition;
is the adoptive father of the child; or
has acknowledged his paternity and, prior to the petition,
has either:
obligated himself to support the child by
(a)
written agreement or court order,
married or attempted to marry the mother in
(b)
a solemnized marriage in apparent compliance with
the law, or
has provided "reasonable and consistent
(c)
payments for the support" of the biological mother
or child in accordance with his means "and has
regularly visited or communicated, or attempted to
visit or communicate" with the mother and/or the
child, or both.2 6
Specifically as to the support and care provisions in Paragraph (6)(c),
the adoption provisions are more stringent than the termination provisions
because, at a minimum, a parent in an adoption must acknowledge paternity,
provide reasonable and consistent payments, and attempt to regularly
communicate with the mother or child before the filing of the petition. In
contrast, in a termination case, a parent can preclude termination solely by
providing substantial financial support - regardless of whether he has
'

(5)
(6)

259. Id. § 48-3-601.
260. § 7B-1111(a)(5) (emphasis added).
261. § 48-3-601 (emphasis added).
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol42/iss2/4
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acknowledged paternity or attempted to have a relationship with the mother
or child. Most importantly, an unwed father who does not know or have
reason to know of his child's existence prior to the filing of an adoption
petition cannot accomplish any of the above adoption provisions prior to the
filing of the adoption petition. To use the phrase coined by Judge Donna
Stroud, writing for the North Carolina Court of Appeals, compliance with
the adoption statutes by a putative father in that instance becomes "a practical
impossibility." 262
Fifth, the nature of the resolutions of termination and adoption
proceedings is substantially different. Termination proceedings occur in a
bifurcated manner. 263 That is, there is first an adjudicatory hearing where the
court determines whether grounds for termination exist.2" In the event they
do exist, and are proven by petitioners by clear and convincing evidence, the
court next holds a best interest hearing to determine whether termination
would be in the best interests of the child. 26 It is completely possible for the
court to determine that, while grounds to terminate exist, it is not in the
child's best interest for the termination to occur. 2 66 In contrast, if an adoption
petition is not contested, the Clerk of Superior Court may issue a decree
without a formal hearing.267 If an adoption petition is contested, a hearing is
held and the court "shall grant the petition upon finding by a preponderance
of the evidence that the adoption will serve the best interests of the child" so
long as other administrative findings are made.2 68
Sixth and finally, in terminations, a motion to reinstate a terminated
parent's rights is permissible in extraordinary circumstances so long as
adoption has not occurred.2 69 In adoptions, a parent's legal and physical
rights are irrevocably severed.270
In sum, notwithstanding that they have the same legal effect of
terminating a biological parent's rights, parents in termination actions enjoy
a right to counsel and the opportunity to meaningfully participate as parties
in the preliminary hearings and bifurcated trial while movants rightfully
shoulder the burden of proof and must meet a greater evidentiary standard of
proof. 27 All of these safeguards are denied to parents in adoption
proceedings, and this lack of safeguards works a special infringement on the
rights of deceived putative fathers.

262. In re S.D.W., 745 S.E.2d 38, 50 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013), rev'd, 758 S.E.2d 374 (N.C. 2014).
263. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-1109 (2017).
264. Id. § 7B-1109(a).
265. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-1110(a) (2017).
266. Id. § 7B-1110(b).
267. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-2-601(a) (2017).
268. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-2-603 (2017) (emphasis added).
269. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-1114(a)(1)-(2) (2017).
270. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-1-106(c) (2017).
See N.C.
STAT. §§ 7B-1100-7B-1114
Published by271.
History
andGEN.
Scholarship
Digital Archives, (2017).
2020
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IN RE ADOPTION OF S.D.W. 272

If a comparison of North Carolina's adoption and termination statutory
schemes serves to highlight the lack of safeguards afforded to deceived
putative fathers, a review of the controlling North Carolina case on this issue
serves as a warning of the harm that can result. In In re Adoption of S.D. W,
the North Carolina Supreme Court held that a putative father had a sufficient
opportunity to develop a relationship with his child even though he was
unaware of the pregnancy, the birth, or the existence of the child until almost
273
The father, Gregory
six months after the adoption petition was filed.
Welker, actively
Laura
mother,
the
because
Joseph Johns, was unaware
concealed the pregnancy and birth, going so far as to provide a false name
on multiple adoption forms.2 74
Between May 2009 and March 2010, Johns and Welker had sex
"hundreds of times." 275 A few months after their relationship began, the
276
parties became pregnant despite Welker's use of an intrauterine device.
2 77
Welker informed Johns, and they agreed to terminate the pregnancy.
Welker began using a different form of birth control, and the parties
continued having sex. 278 John never wore condoms during these sexual
encounters. 2 79 After the parties ultimately broke up in early March 2010,
Welker cut off contact with Johns. 280
Unbeknownst to Johns, Welker had become pregnant and gave birth to
his son, S.D.W., on October 10, 2010.281 Because the parties had not been in
contact since early March 2010, Johns had no reason to know that Welker
2 82
had been pregnant and given birth in October. One day after S.D.W. was
born, Welker relinquished the child for adoption, falsely listing "Gregory
Thomas James" as the child's father and leaving the line for Johns' last
283
- despite knowing both his
known address blank on the adoption forms
2 84
failed to identify Johns on
also
had
Welker
proper name and address.
S.D.W.'s birth certificate, and she would go on to falsely list "Gregory
Thomas James" on another adoption form in an effort to thwart Johns'
discovery of his son.285

272. For ease of reference in text and citation, this article refers to the N.C. Court of Appeals
opinion as "In re S.D.W." and the N.C. Supreme Court opinion as "In re Adoption of S.D.W." as
that is how the opinions are titled by the courts.
273. In re Adoption of S.D.W., 758 S.E.2d at 375.
274. Id. at 376. Welker supplied, "Gregory Thomas James" instead of "Gregory Joseph Johns."
275. Id. at 375.
276. Id. at 376.
277. Id.
278. Id.

279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 380.
283. Id. at 376.
284. Id. at 382.
285. Id. at 383.
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol42/iss2/4
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Two days after S.D.W. was born, S.D.W. began living with prospective
adoptive parents. 286 The prospective adoptive parents filed a petition to adopt
on November 2, 2010, just twenty-three days after S.D.W. was born.287 On
November 26, 2010, Welker reinitiated contact with Johns for the purpose
of having an isolated incident of sexual intercourse and did not inform him
she had been pregnant or given birth. 288 More than five months later,
sometime in late April 2011, Johns first heard a rumor that Welker had given
birth to a child. 289 Johns confronted Welker, who initially denied having been
pregnant. 290 On April 25, 2011, Welker admitted to Johns she had given birth
to his son and placed him for adoption.291
The specific date the adoption petition was filed (November 2, 2010)
was critical because this was the date before which Johns would have had to
comply with the statutory requirements of Section 48-3-601 for his consent
to the adoption to be required. 2 92 That is, in order for Johns to exercise his
constitutionally protected opportunity to develop a relationship with his son
as contemplated in Lehr, he would have needed to: (1) acknowledge
paternity of S.D.W.; (2) provide reasonable and consistent support to Welker
and/or S.D.W.; and (3) attempt to visit or communicate with Welker and/or
S.D.W. before November 2, 2010.293 Unfortunately, Johns did not learn of
either the child or the pregnancy until almost six months later.294
It would seem impossible for a father to acknowledge paternity of a
child under Section 48-3-601 when he does not know about either the
existence of a child or even of a pregnancy. 295 Herein lies the procedural
inadequacy of North Carolina's adoption scheme to protect Johns and all
similarly situated putative fathers. Indeed, Johns was not faulted under any
of the other provisions of Section 48-3-601. He was not faulted for failing to
file a legitimation proceeding before that date. 296 He was not faulted for
failing to enter into a child support agreement prior to that date. 2 97 He was
not faulted for failing to receive S.D.W. into his home prior to that date. 298
He was not faulted for failing to openly hold out S.D.W. as his biological
286. Id. at 376.

287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 383.
290. Id.
291. In re S.D.W., 745 S.E.2d at 41.

292. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-3-601 (2017); see supranote 21 and accompanying text.
293. § 48-3-601(2)(b)(4)(II).
294. In re Adoption of S.D.W., 758 S.E.2d 374, 383 (Jackson, dissenting).
295. These situations are distinguishable from cases where a putative father knows of either a
pregnancy or birth before the petition but does not know if it is his child. In those instances, the
father can at least take some steps to comply with Section 48-3-601. "Yet § 48-3-601 does not allow
a potential father's support obligation to be conditioned on establishing a biological link with the
child." In re Byrd, 529 S.E.2d 465, 468 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000); see also Matter of Adoption of
C.H.M., 812 S.E.2d 804,806 (2018) (birth mother first told the putative father the child belonged
to him, but the child was a product of a sexual assault by an unknown man).

296. § 48-3-601(2)(b)(3).
297. § 48-3-601(2)(b)(4)(I).
298.
§ 48-3-601(2)(b)(5).
Published by
History
and Scholarship Digital Archives, 2020
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child prior to that date.2 9 He was not even faulted for failing to marry
Welker. 3 0
The only way to assign fault to Johns - that is, the only way to find that
the qualifications for notice were within Johns' control - was to conclude
that he was on notice of the actual pregnancy from the first act of sex that
could give rise to a pregnancy. Hence, "sex is notice," and the precedent of
In re Adoption of S.D. W. ensures that similarly situated fathers will likely be
denied their constitutionally protected opportunities to develop relationships
with their children.
At the trial level, as soon as Welker told Johns she had placed their son
for adoption, Johns attempted every legal avenue available to prevent the
adoption in order to develop a relationship with his son. Johns responded
promptly to the notice of adoption, ensuring his consent would not be vitiated
by Section 48-3-603(a)(7). 301 Additionally, he asked to intervene in the
adoption, moved to dismiss the adoption, requested child custody, and
sought DNA testing. 302 The petitioners filed a motion for summary judgment,
arguing that Johns did not have standing to intervene and that his consent to
the adoption was not required.3 0 3 Johns then filed a host of motions alleging
that his consent was necessary, he had standing to intervene, fraud had been
3
perpetrated, and his constitutional rights had been violated. 4 After a
hearing, the trial court granted the petitioners' motion for summary
judgment, denied all of Johns' motions, found that his consent was not
necessary, and allowed the adoption to proceed.305
Johns' appeal to the North Carolina Court of Appeals essentially arose
under the second prong of Lehr: that the qualifications for notice were
beyond his control. 3" The Court of Appeals agreed that requiring strict
compliance with Section 48-3-601 in instances where a putative father was
unaware of his child's existence until after the adoption petition had been
filed might violate a father's due process rights under the federal and state
constitutions. 307 It reasoned that Section 48-3-601 might be unconstitutional

"

299. Id.
300. Perhaps one could say Johns was not expressly faulted for failing to marry Welker since
the majority did characterize Johns as "demonstrat[ing] only incuriosity and disinterest" after the
parties' relationship ended. In re Adoption of S.D.W., 758 S.E.2d at 380. Welker changed her phone
number and "cut off all contact" with Johns after the relationship ended. Id. at 374, 382. Judge
Stroud, writing for the majority in the Court of Appeals' opinion, considered this conundrum and
refused to fault Johns for failing to engage in behaviors that might violate anti-stalking statutes. In
re S.D.W., 745 S.E.2d at 49.
301. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-3-603(A)(7) (2017) provides: "Consent to an adoption of a minor is
not required of a person or entity whose consent is not required under G.S. 48-3-601, or any of the
following: .... (7) An individual listed in G.S. 48-3-601 who has not executed a consent or a
relinquishment and who fails to respond to a notice of the adoption proceeding within 30 days after
the service of the notice ....
302. In re Adoption of S.D.W., 758 S.E.2d at 376-77.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 377.
306. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 264 (1983).
307. In re S.D.W., 745 S.E.2d at 44.
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol42/iss2/4
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if a father could "show that he promptly attempted to grasp the opportunity
of fatherhood once he discovered his [child's] existence, but the statute
foreclosed that opportunity." 308 In characterizing statutory compliance in
these instances as a "practical impossibility," the court was careful to limit
its holding to cases where a father did not know, or have reason to know, of
the pregnancy but could promptly take steps while the adoption proceeding
was stillpending.30 9
The North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the grant of summary
judgment to petitioners. Also, the court remanded the case with instructions
to hold a hearing about whether Johns had developed a constitutionally
protected interest sufficient to require his consent.310 It suggested that any
unconstitutional application of Section 48-3-601 could be remedied by the
trial court inquiring whether Johns: (1) took affirmative steps to assume
parental responsibility; (2) after the point in time when he knew or should
have known of the pregnancy; and (3) before the adoption decree was
fmalized. 3
Applying this paradigm generally would safeguard a putative father's
constitutionally protected opportunity in instances where he would otherwise
be precluded from attaining any status by the action of either the mother or
a third party. Moreover, it would have appropriately balanced the competing
interests of the child in having a stable and permanent home, the parents in
exercising their fundamental rights and opportunities, and other third parties
in protecting the child's welfare.
Petitioners appealed. 1 2 The North Carolina Supreme Court rejected the
three-pronged framework. It concluded that, despite the mother's deception,
Johns had "the opportunity to be on notice of the pregnancy and that he failed
to grasp that opportunity by taking any of the steps that would establish him
as a responsible father."3 1 3 This conclusion ignores that the opportunity
discussed in Lehr is not an "opportunity to be on notice of the pregnancy," it
is the "opportunity to develop a relationship with his offspring" 1 which one
cannot possibly take if one does not know - or have reason to know - he is
a father. Instead, Lehr should be read as standing for the proposition that a
putative father has a right to be on notice of the pregnancy, so then he can

308. Id. at 40.
309. Id. at 49-50. In discussing decisions from other jurisdictions, the opinion favorably
emphasizes language from a Kansas Supreme Court opinion, suggesting that a child's interest in
stability, the interests of third parties, and other policy reasons may eventually "justify a rule that a
putative father's opportunity to develop a parenting relationship ends with the finalization of a
newborn child's adoption even if the reason the father did not grasp his opportunity was because
of the mother's fraud." In re Adoption of A.A.T., 196 P.3d 1180, 1196 (Kan. 2008), cert. denied,
556 U.S. 1184 (2009).
310. In re S.D.W., 745 S.E.2d at 51.
311. Id. at 49-50.
312. In re Adoption of S.D.W., 758 S.E.2d at 375.

313. Id. at 381.
Lehr,and
463 Scholarship
U.S. at 262. Digital Archives, 2020
Published by314.
History
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choose whether to exercise his constitutionally protected opportunity to
develop a relationship with his child.
3
In focusing largely on the fact that Johns did not use a condom, " the
N.C. Supreme Court appears to be concerned not with when a putative father
discovers he might be the father, but rather when the putative father
discovers he might be a father. Naturally, this occurs when a putative father
engages in sexual intercourse. Since no forms of birth control, except for
abstinence, are one hundred percent effective, this leads to the conclusion
that if one has sexual intercourse, one is on notice that pregnancy might
result. Notwithstanding the majority's pronouncement that its decision was
not to be interpreted as "sex is notice,"316 following their reasoning, it is
difficult to see how the outcome would have been different had Johns used
a condom (albeit a necessarily defective one).
It is true that Mr. Johns would not likely have found himself in such a
tragic and unique predicament if only he had "saved himself for marriage."
However, abstinence outside of marriage or "sex is notice" should not
realistically be the legal safeguards in present-day America, where almost
3
forty percent of babies are born to unmarried women. "'Indeed, the law has
already acquiesced to the presence of children born out of wedlock through
318
legitimation and paternity statutory schemes. If the state legislature does
not take action to protect fathers similarly situated to Mr. Johns, it is difficult
319
to predict the legacy this precedent will leave.

315. In re Adoption of S.D.W., 758 S.E.2d at 374, 381-82 (Jackson, dissenting). Also, compare
the majority's view of the evidence with the dissent's view of it. "From John's perspective, the sex
was unprotected, and contraception was wholly Welker's responsibility. The burden on him to find
out whether he had sired a child was minimal, for he knew how to contact Welker. All he had to
was ask, for when he finally did call her, she told him." Id. at 381 (Justice Edmunds, writing for
the majority). This contrasts with the dissent's view of the evidence which observed that Welker
told Johns that she was using specific birth control, Welker had not concealed her previous
pregnancy from Johns, Welker actively concealed the new pregnancy from Johns, Welker listed no
father on the birth certificate, Welker provided a false name on multiple adoption forms, and Welker
initially lied to Johns about the pregnancy when he first asked. Id. at 380. The majority reasoned
"[b]ecause of his passivity in the face of ample evidence that Welker may have become pregnant
with his child and given birth," the qualifications for notice were not beyond Johns' control. It then
follows that the Court believes Johns had the ability to comply with Section 48-3-601 before he
knew Welker had been pregnant, given birth, or put the child up for adoption. Id. at 381.
316. Id. at 380. "Johns contends that petitioners urge us to adopt a rule that an act of sex is by
itself notice of a possible resulting pregnancy. We instead decide this case on the basis of the facts
as applied to the statutes. Both parents demonstrated troubling behavior."
317. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Unmarried Childbearing, NAT'L CTR. FOR
HEALTH STAT., https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/unmarried-childbearing.htm (last visited Aug.
17, 2019).
318. See Articles 2 and 3 of Chapter 49 of the NORTH CAROLINA GENERAL STATUTES,
respectively.
319. See the unpublished decision of In re the Adoption of S.K.G., No. COA17-638, 2018 WL
414149, at *5-6 (N.C. Ct. App. Jan. 16, 2018). In S.K.G., the putative father tried to distinguish
himself from Mr. Johns in S.D. W and was successful in doing so - but only to his detriment. The
putative father had "unprotected" sex a few times with the mother, but he saw her visibly pregnant
months after they had broken up. Id. at *5-6. The mother did not attempt to deceive the putative
father; she notified him as soon as the baby was born when she realized it was of mixed race. Id.
Despite the fact that she was married and living with a boyfriend, the putative father's timeframe

https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol42/iss2/4
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V. FRAUD PROTECTIONS IN OTHER STATES

Other jurisdictions frequently make allowance for the possibility that
the father may be hindered in his efforts to comply with notice statutes. Some
have expressly recognized that adoptions and terminations should require
similar safeguards, for example, in the form of shifting the burden of proof
or excusing statutory compliance with a showing of "justifiable cause."" 0
The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, in In Re Adoption of Tobias D.,
decided there was no reason to dispense with the same constitutional
safeguards "simply because the termination is accomplished by private
parties in the context of an adoption." 32' In Tobias, the birth mother initially
told the father ("R.M.") about the pregnancy; she later stated she had an
abortion, and R.M. believed her. 2 After giving the child up for adoption,
the mother wrote a letter to R.M. when the baby was four months old, telling
him that she had given birth to his child. 3 Citing an earlier termination
proceeding,32 4 the state supreme court set aside R.M.'s termination of
parental rights and gave the trial court this guidance:
A parent's fitness also must be evaluated in the context of all relevant
circumstances. This is not a case in which a person who has had the
opportunity to parent a child has failed to do so adequately. Rather, as
the [trial court] correctly emphasized in its order, R.M. has been
precluded from developing any relationship with this child; in fact, he

-

for complying with Section 48-3-601 began, at the latest, when he visibly saw the mother pregnant.
Id. at *6. At that point, he had a duty to acknowledge paternity, regularly communicate with the
mother, and provide support without knowing whether the child was his. In both S.K. G. and S.D. W.,
the courts obliquely admonish the fathers for relying on the mothers' statements that they were
using birth control. Id. at *5-6 ("respondent left responsibility for birth control solely to the mother"
who told him she was "on the shot"); In re Adoption of S.D.W., 367 N.C. at 376 (despite evidence
that the mother was using a birth control shot, the court noted that "Johns continued his practice of
not wearing a condom"). This language seems to suggest that Mr. Johns was - in a way
contributorily negligent in producing a child and thus should be barred from exercising any inchoate
interest he might have had had he only used a condom. But cf In the Matter of the Adoption of
S.K.N., 735 S.E.2d 382 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012) (father satisfied the support and communication
requirements of the adoption consent statute by living with mother both during and after her
pregnancy, even though he was unaware of the pregnancy).
320. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Tobias D., 40 A.3d 990 (Me. 2011) (father's lack of
opportunity to form a relationship with the child precluded a finding by clear and convincing
evidence for termination of rights); Matter of Adoption of K.A.S., 499 N.W.2d 558 (N.D. 1993)
(there was sufficient state action in stepparent adoption proceedings to trigger protection of equal
protection, though parental termination need not be initiated by state); Matter of K.L.J., 813 P.2d
276 (Alaska 1991) (prospective adoptive parent must prove by clear and convincing evidence that
biological parent's failure to communicate with child was "without justifiable cause"); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 19-5-203(1)(d)(II) (2019) (a child may be available for adoption if birth parents have failed
"without cause" to provide reasonable support).
321. In re Adoption of Tobias D., 40 A.3d 990, 996 (Me. 2011).
322. Id. at 992.
323. Id. at 993.
324. Justice Gorman of the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine observed, "the father's lack of an
opportunity to form a relationship with the child precluded a finding by clear and convincing
evidence that the father was unfit or unable to 'provide a nurturing parental relationship with his
child once the relationship with the child can be re-established."' Id. at 998 (emphasis added)
In re and
CodyScholarship
T., 979 A.2d 81,
86 (Me.
2009)). 2020
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was completely unaware of this child's existence for the first four
months of the child's life. Since learning of the child's existence, R.M.
consistently has made efforts, albeit unsuccessfully, to contact and
develop a relationship with him. 325
Iowa and Delaware have also had an opportunity to address an
unmarried father's burden to discover his progeny. In Iowa, an unwed father
did not abandon his rights even though he failed to take immediate action
upon learning of the pregnancy. 2 6 The father, Daniel, did not initially have
any indication from the mother that he was the child's father, and the mother
321
Justice
was dating another man at the time the adoption was initiated.
Larson, writing for the supreme court, observed "[t]he argument that the best
interests of the baby are best served by allowing her to stay with [the adoptive
parents] is a very alluring argument . . .. Daniel has had a poor performance
record as a parent [in the past.]"3 28 However, the court pointed out that within
one month after he first learned that the child might be his, Daniel met with
an attorney, requested blood tests, filed a motion to vacate the termination
order, and filed a petition to intervene in the adoption case. 329 "In fact,
virtually all of the evidence regarding Daniel's intent regarding this baby
suggests just the opposite: Daniel did everything he could reasonably do to
assert his parental rights, beginning even before he knew that he was the
father." 330 Finding that the trial court could not have determined by clear and
convincing evidence that Daniel had abandoned his child, the Iowa court
elaborated in dicta:
It has been urged that the court should uphold this proposed adoption
on the ground that the father had abandoned his rights by failing to
protect them, beginning at the time the pregnancy became known. In
other words, it is suggested that this father should have acted to protect
his parental rights immediately when the pregnancy became known,
even though he had no indication from her that he was the father and
even though she was dating another man at the time. This, of course,
is unrealistic; it would require a potential father to become involved
in the pregnancy on the mere speculation that he might be the father
because he was one of the men having sexual relations with her at the
time in question.
Iowa Code § 600A.8 requires that abandonment be shown by clear
and convincing evidence. To hold that Daniel's action was required
immediately on knowledge of the pregnancy, at the risk of losing his
parental rights, would fly in the face of that standard .. .. More
important, a finding of abandonment under these circumstances would

325.
326.
327.
328.
329.

Id. at 998.
In the Interest of B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239 (Iowa 1992).
Id. at 241.
Id. at 245.
Id. at 246.

330. Id.
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol42/iss2/4
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deprive a father of a meaningful right, protected by the Constitution,
to develop a parent-child relationship."'
The Supreme Court of Iowa set aside the termination for abandonment
and affirmed the dismissal of the adoption against Daniel. 3 2
The Delaware Family Court cited this same Iowa case in deciding that
an unwed father's rights could not be terminated to allow an adoption to go
through. In Matter of Baby Girl T., the mother's pregnancy resulted from a
single sexual encounter with father, and both parents testified they were
certain they used birth control. 3 The adoption agency argued that the father
should have acted to assert his parental rights as soon as he heard a rumor
that the mother might be pregnant, even though he had no indication from
her that he was the father and even though she was living with another man
at the time." 4 The court disagreed, stating that such a standard would also
require men to force continued contact with women with whom they were
no longer involved."'
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma found that a birth father was denied
the "chance to grasp his parental opportunity interest" when the mother
failed to inform him she was pregnant, placed the baby for adoption, and
falsely claimed not to know the father's identity or whereabouts. 336 The court
stated that the birth father had a right to notice of the fact that the mother was
pregnant and had given birth. It had no reservations about ascribing a duty
to inform to the mother, especially given the "relative ease with which this
could have been accomplished."337 Similarly, a father's non-support under a
South Carolina adoption statute was excused where a mother falsely told the
father she had aborted the child and thereafter obtained a no-contact order
against him.338
As the courts of Maine, Iowa, Delaware, Oklahoma, and South Carolina
illustrate, courts have been willing to set aside adoptions and termination
proceedings where either a mother has affirmatively deceived a putative
father about her pregnancy, where the mother has simply failed to inform the
father, or where the father knows about the pregnancy but does not know
whether he is the biological father. In doing so, these courts have recognized
that adoptions have the same effect of terminating the putative father's rights
as any termination proceeding and that putative fathers should be entitled to
the same level of notice and opportunity to intervene in adoption actions as
in termination proceedings. Moreover, these courts have rightly rejected the

331. Id. at 241 n.1.
332. Id. at 246-47.
333. Matter of Baby Girl T., 715 A.2d 99, 101 (Del. Fam. Ct. 1998).
334. Id. at 102.
335. Id. at 104.
336. In re Baby Boy W., 988 P.2d 1270, 1274 (Okla. 1999) (affirming that father's consent was
necessary for adoption).

337. Id.
552 S.E.2dDigital
761, 763
(S.C. 2001).
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theory that "sex is notice," whether the pregnancies resulted from one sexual
encounter or many, whether protected or unprotected.
There are a significant number of jurisdictions that impliedly or
33 9
Notably, however, most
expressly embrace the theory that "sex is notice."
34 0
In fact, more
registries.
father
of these same jurisdictions have putative
341
And states with
than half of the states have putative father registries.
putative father registries frequently make registration a strict requirement,
regardless of a mother's deceptive acts, in order for a father to receive notice
and opportunity to contest an adoption.342 Thus, sex becomes notice in these
jurisdictions even when it is not implied or expressed by statute.
For example, in Indiana, despite the facts that the mother failed to
inform the father about her pregnancy, placed the baby for adoption, and
falsely claimed not to know the identity or whereabouts of the father, a
343
father's failure to register was not excused. In Arkansas, a father's failure
to register was not excused when a pregnancy resulted from one isolated
sexual encounter, and the mother failed to inform the father due to religious
and privacy reasons." The courts deciding these cases seemed focused on
the short duration of the sexual relationship and an unwillingness to impose
a duty on the mother to inform.
A registration's "sex is notice" policy may even conflict with other
statutory schemes affecting putative fathers. In Georgia, a father is entitled
34 5
to notice of an adoption proceeding only if he has registered. Further, any
man who has engaged in a non-marital sexual relationship with a woman is
deemed to be on notice that a pregnancy and adoption proceeding regarding
a child might occur and has a duty to protect his own rights and interests in
339. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-106.01(F) (2019) (example of express: " ... fact that the
putative father had sexual intercourse with the mother is deemed to be notice to the putative father
of the pregnancy."); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.088(1) (West 2019) (express); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-812(a)(6) (West 2019) (express); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16-1504(5)(c) (West 2019) (example of
implied: "Lack of knowledge of the pregnancy is not an acceptable reason for his failure to timely
file notice .... "); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/12.1(g) (West 2019) (implied); MINN. STAT.
ANN. §259.52 (West 2019) (implied); MO. ANN. STAT. § 192.016(6) (West 2019) (implied); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.061 (West 2019) (express); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-1 10(1)(a)(i) (West
2019) (express); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1250(A) (West 2019) (express); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 48.42(2m)(b) (West 2019) (express).
340. South Dakota, which does not have a putative father registry, is one of the few states that
has been presented with a case factually similar to S.D. W. In South Dakota, despite the fact the
mother lied about the father's identity to the court, a father's paternity action was dismissed where
the parties had a "fleeting" relationship, and the mother failed to inform the father of the pregnancy.
Matter of Baby Boy K., 546 N.W.2d 86, 101 (S.D. 1996). Thus, the same injustice that occurred to
Mr. Johns occurs elsewhere where there is no mechanism by which an unwed father may preserve
his right to notice and opportunity.
341. U.S. Dept. of Health & Hum. Servs., supra note 5.
342. For a discussion of states with putative father registries, including a chart showing how
they operate, see generally Mary Beck, Toward a National PutativeFatherRegistry Database, 25
HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1031 (2002).
343. In re Paternity of Baby Doe, 734 N.E.2d 281, 287 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).
344. In re Adoption of S.J.B., 745 S.W.2d 606, 607 (Ark. 1988).
345. In re V.B.L., 703 S.E.2d 127, 129 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-11-9(d)(3)
(West
2019).
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol42/iss2/4
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that child. 346
In contrast, in a legitimation proceeding in Georgia, the
courts are charged with first determining whether a father has abandoned his
"opportunity interest"347 to develop a relationship with a child before
granting a petition to legitimate. 348 "[A]nother relevant factor affecting
[father's opportunity interest] would likely include whether the father's
failure to support and develop a relationship with the child was attributable
in some part to actions taken by the mother to impede the father's ability to
learn of the child's existence."34 9 It is not clear why the court might be
allowed to inquire into a mother's deception in the case of legitimation but
not in the case of adoption, when denial of the father's claims in either case
effectively terminates any inchoate or constitutional rights the father might

otherwise have.

"

Some of the statutory schemes that promulgate a putative father registry
also contain provisions amounting to an "impossibility exception," - that is,
provisions for when strict compliance with the registry will be excused." 0
However, lack of knowledge of the pregnancy or birth is usually stated not
to be an acceptable reason for failure to register.
Illustrative examples of the "impossibility exception" joined with "sex
is notice" provisions can be found in Illinois and Minnesota. Illinois and
Minnesota waive strict compliance with their putative father registry
requirements if a putative father can prove by clear and convincing evidence:
(1) it was not possible for him to register within the period of time specified;
(2) his failure to register was through no fault of his own; and (3) he
registered within ten days after it became possible.32 However, both
statutory schemes specifically state that a lack of knowledge of the
pregnancy or birth is not an acceptable reason for failure to register.33
In reviewing Illinois and Minnesota case law, it does not appear that
either state has had the opportunity to address the interplay of these
provisions where a mother has successfully concealed a pregnancy and birth
from a putative father up through the filing of an adoption petition. In the
few cases that have addressed exceptions for failing to register, none of the
putative fathers have been able to meet the "impossibility exception" because
in every case, the father at least knew the mother was pregnant while she was
pregnant, as opposed to finding out about the pregnancy after the fact." 4
Therefore, it is hard to tell what, if any, circumstances would satisfy
such a vaguely-worded "impossibility exception" when it is joined with "sex
346. VB.L., 703 S.E.2d at 129.
347. Id. at 130 (noting that putative father's interest is called either "opportunity interest" or
"inchoate interest," no doubt channeling language from Lehr).
348. Id. at 128.
349. Id. at 129.
350. Beck, supranote 102, at 1080-81.
351. See supra note 99.
352. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 50/12.1(g) (2019); MINN. STAT. § 259.52(8) (2019).
353. Id.
354. In re K.J.R., 687 N.E.2d 113 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997); Heidbreder v. Carton, 645 N.W.2d 355
2002); and
T.D. Scholarship
v. A.K., 677 N.W.2d
(Minn. Ct.
App. 2004).
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is notice." What does it mean for something to not be "possible" under those
statutes? Only extremely debilitating or unusual circumstances that would
have nothing to do with a mother's deception come to mind, for example, if
the putative father was deported or comatose during the statutory registration
period or if a man was raped while he was unconscious and he unknowingly
sired a child. Thus, this seems to be an instance where the exception is, for
all practical purposes, swallowed by the rule. These statutory schemes, and
others like them, would not provide adequate protection for putative fathers
similarly situated with Mr. Johns.
Virginia's putative father registry scheme includes a specific
impossibility exception that excuses fathers from registration in instances
where they knew about the pregnancy but were subsequently deceived as to
the outcome by the mother.3 " In that instance, the father is excused from
having timely registered if the father was led to believe through the birth
mother's misrepresentation that: (1) the pregnancy was terminated or the
mother miscarried when in fact the baby was born; or (2) the child died when
in fact the child lived. 356 So long as the father registers within ten days of his
discovery of the misrepresentation, he may participate in a subsequent
adoption proceeding. 357 In fact, he may move to set aside an adoption after it
is finalized. 358 Like all states wishing to promote the finality of adoptions, a
final order in Virginia is not subject to collateral or direct attack after six
months, 359 but there is at least one case which suggests that this six-month
limitation is unconstitutional in cases where a putative father can prove an
adoption was obtained by fraud.360 Again, however, this statutory scheme
would not provide adequate protection for putative fathers who have no
knowledge of the pregnancy or birth.
Thus, it appears that, while North Carolina's stance to treat "sex as
notice" is in line with many other jurisdictions that likewise do so, it is not
at all clear that this stance is defensible from a constitutional standpoint since
North Carolina has not also promulgated a putative father registry. This is
especially true if a reviewing court were to closely scrutinize the complex
line of precedents leading up to In Re Adoption of S.D. W 36

355.
356.
357.
358.

VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1250(C) (West 2019).
Id.
Id.
VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1216 (West 2019).

359. Id.
360. See F.E. v. G.F.M., 547 S.E.2d 531, 537-38 (Va. Ct. App. 2001); Cf Nelson v. Middlesex
Dept. of Soc. Servs., 820 S.E.2d 400, 407 n.8 (Va. Ct. App. 2018) (constitutional exception of sixmonth limitation was not implicated where grandparents were challengers of adoption).
361. "Our court has previously considered and rejected the argument that a putative father 'was
unable to take the steps set out in [the termination statutes] because he did not know of the
existence of the child. The similarity of the requirements between the statute permitting the
termination of a putative father's rights and the statute requiring the consent of a father of a child
born out of wedlock to its adoption reflect the intention of the legislature not to make an
'illegitimate child's future welfare dependent on whether or not the putative father knows of the
child's existence at the time the petition is filed."' A Child's Hope, LLC v. Doe, 630 S.E.2d 673,
677 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006) (quoting In re T.L.B., 605 S.E.2d 249, 252 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004), citing
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It is enticing to adopt a "sex is notice" policy. Doing so ensures that
there is a bright-line test for what a putative father must do and when he must
do it in order for him to manifest his commitment to a putative child.
However, this position unfairly relieves the mother of any duty to inform,
absolves her of any penalty for deceptive conduct, and burdens putative
fathers with a plethora of statutory duties to fulfill before the fathers even
have a suspicion of a pregnancy.
Once a woman becomes pregnant, the woman and man are no longer
similarly situated. Because of her inescapable biology, a mother knows she
is pregnant. When a putative father becomes aware of his impending or
actual fatherhood is much less clear and usually depends on an admission
from the mother, first-hand observation, third-party rumors, or receipt of
court process for termination, adoption, custody, or support. Because the
mother has this superior knowledge, when she actively hides her pregnancy
to fraudulently accomplish an adoption, the statutory scheme becomes
unconstitutional where it does not afford a putative father notice and a
meaningful opportunity to develop a relationship with his offspring. 362

VI. PROPOSED STATUTORY SAFEGUARDS FOR PUTATIVE FATHERS
A putative father must have some unilateral action he can take to grasp
his constitutionally protected opportunity irrespective of a mother's
deception. Unlike current compliance with Section 48-3-601, the unilateral
action should be something that does not depend on knowledge of the
pregnancy or birth, should not be overburdensome to putative fathers, and
should allow putative fathers to become involved as early as possible in the
proceedings. A putative father registry, together with some amendments to
the current adoption code, would ensure putative fathers receive adequate
notice and opportunity to participate meaningfully in any proposed adoption.
It would provide a notice procedure to the father while minimizing an unwed
mother's duty to inform.

In re Adoption of Clark, 381 S.E.2d 835, 839 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989), rev'd, 393 S.E.2d 791 (1990)).
The Clark opinion from the N.C. Court of Appeals is frequently cited for the proposition that a
father's awareness makes no difference in determining compliance with adoption or termination
consent requirements. In finding the father's consent unnecessary, the Court of Appeals in Clark
based its decision on the legislative intent that states when the interests of a child and those of an
adult are in conflict, such conflict should be resolved in favor of the child. See N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 48-1-100 (2017). However, Johns' appellate counsel pointed out in Respondent-Appellee's New
Brief at 33-34 (In re Adoption of S.D.W., 758 S.E.2d 374 (N.C. 2014) (No. 348PA13)) that a close
reading of the N.C. Supreme Court's opinion in Clark shows that it was not reversed on other
grounds (as it is so often cited), but instead was reversed because the adoption was procedurally
defective. 393 S.E.2d at 795. Thus, one could argue that the Court of Appeals' reasoning - on which
subsequent cases have been based - was not entitled to the precedential value it has enjoyed for the
past thirty years. The Supreme Court in Clark carefully noted, "[Respondent] argued in his brief
that his due process and equal protection rights are violated by these adoption statutes which could
allow a biological father to lose parental rights to a child when he did not know he had a child.
However, since Mr. Lampe's consent is necessary for the adoption in this case to proceed, we need
not address these constitutional issues." 393 S.E.2d at 795-96.
463 U.S.
248, Archives,
262 (1983). 2020
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A. PUTATIVE FATHER REGISTRY - MINIMUM PROVISIONS

1. PROVIDE A UNILATERAL MECHANISM FOR PUTATIVE FATHERS
First, while In re Adoption of S.D. W remains good law, the North
Carolina General Assembly should promulgate a putative father registry.
Putative father registries provide a place for a man to list identifying
information about himself and the mother, together with an anticipated birth
date of a putative child.3" As a best practice, a man should be allowed to
register as early as his first sexual encounter, without regard to the biological
parents' marital status, dating relationship, or continued communication. It
should not depend on the mother divulging her pregnancy or birth status.
2.

Allow Early, Ignorant Registration

Any constitutional challenges by unaware putative fathers to North
Carolina's current adoption laws would be more defensible where a putative
father can take unilateral action to preserve his constitutional opportunity as
early as his first incident of unprotected (or protected) sex. In that vein,
Montana expressly allows a putative father to register "before a child's birth
even though the putative father has no actual knowledge that a pregnancy
has occurred or that a pregnancy has continued through gestation."" If a
statutory scheme is going to require a father to register to receive notice but
at the same time proclaim that "sex is notice," then the father should be
allowed to register immediately after a sexual encounter if he so chooses.
3.

Publicize the Putative Father Registry

35
A putative father registry is only as good as its conspicuousness ; its
availability, and the effect of non-registration, must be adequately
publicized. 31 Virginia's registry scheme charges its Department of Health
with publicizing the putative father registry via pamphlet and general public
services announcements. 367 The Department must distribute pamphlets at all
offices of the Department of Health and all local departments of social
services, and it must distribute pamphlets to hospitals, libraries, medical
clinics, schools, baccalaureate institutions of higher education, and "other
368
providers of child-related services upon request."

4.

Make the Registry an Inclusive Scheme, Not an Exclusive Scheme

Failure to file with the registry, by itself, should not waive a father's
right to contest a child's adoption where he takes other steps, such as filing

U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., supra note 5.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 42-2-206(2) (2019).
See generally Beck, supra note 102 (arguing for a national putative father registry).
366. Alexandra R. Dapolito, Comment, The Failure to Notify Putative Fathers of Adoption
Proceedings:Balancingthe Adoption Equation,42 CATH. U.L. REV. 979, 1025 (1993).
367. VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1253 (West 2019).
368. Id.
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol42/iss2/4
363.
364.
365.

18

Kamarchick: Sex as Constructive Notice-North Carolina's Need for a Putative f

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

210

[Vol. 42:2

a paternity action, 369 filing a legitimation action, 37 or otherwise
acknowledging paternity. To ensure that it is inclusive, the adoption code
should require interested parties to search the registry and provide notice to
putative fathers found therein.
Without these minimal safeguards in cases where a putative father has
no reason to know of a sexual partner's pregnancy, North Carolina's current
qualifications for notice are "beyond the control" of interested putative
fathers and thus are "procedurally inadequate.""
B.

1.

OTHER STATUTORY PROVISIONS - BEST PRACTICES

Affirmatively Reject "Sex is Notice" by Including Meaningful

Impossibility Exceptions
For a more comprehensive framework372 that would balance the
interests and purposes of adoption, the registry and/or adoption code should
include "impossibility exceptions" for instances where a mother deceives a
putative father about the existence of either the pregnancy or child. This
could be accomplished within the adoption code by implementing the North
Carolina Court of Appeals' three-pronged analysis set forth in In Re S.D. W
In those instances, trial courts should hold a hearing to determine whether
the putative father: (1) took affirmative steps to assume parental
responsibility; (2) after the point in time when he knew or should have
known of the pregnancy; and (3) before the adoption decree was finalized."3
This third prong might be revised to provide a longer, outer limit if the
General Assembly decides that the interests and policies underlying adoption
support allowing direct or collateral attacks for some period after the
adoption is finalized.374

369. See David C. v. Alexis S., 375 P.3d 945 (Ariz. 2016) (father who served a paternity action
preserved his right to establish paternity despite his failure to strictly comply with the putative
father registration requirement).
370. See Ex parte S.C.W., 826 So.2d 844 (Ala. 2001) (filing with putative father registry was
one of several ways in which a putative father could earn the right to consent to an adoption).
371. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 264. In Lehr, the father could have guaranteed that he would have
received notice of the adoption proceedings by registering with New York's putative father registry.

Id. at 250-51.
372. Note that the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws promulgated
a revised Uniform Adoption Act in 1994 ("UAA"), which has been endorsed by the American Bar
Association. See Joan Heifetz Hollinger, The Uniform Adoption Act: Reporter's Ruminations, 30
FAM. L.Q. 345, 356 (1996). For a proposal that North Carolina should adopt the UAA, see generally
Erin E. Gibbs, PreservingYour Right to Parent: The Supreme Court ofNorth CarolinaAddresses
UnmarriedFathers'Due Process Rights in In re Adoption of S.D. W., 94 N.C. L. REv. 723 (2016).
The UAA has been criticized for its lack of adequate birthfather notification controls, as well as
other reasons. See Audra Behnd, Balancingthe Adoption Triangle: The State, The Adoptive Parents
and the Birth Parents- Where Does the Adoptee Fit In?, 15 IN PUB. INTEREST 49, 74-76 (1997).
To date only Vermont and Michigan have adopted it in part. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A §§ 1-101-9101 (West 2019); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 710.21-710.70 (West 2019).
373. In re S.D.W., 745 S.E.2d at 49-50.
B.3. Archives, 2020
infra Section
374.
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Toll the Time Period for Registration for Unaware Fathers

Where an impossibility exception is implicated and the putative father
is able to prove that he satisfies the three prongs of the impossibility
exception set forth above, the registry and/or adoption code should toll the
time period for registry or waive strict compliance with the registry as other
jurisdictions have done. This would minimize any challenge made by a
putative father that the state's statutory schemes violate due process by
creating a "practical impossibility."37 5 After all, "[d]ue process requires
adequate notice, a realistic opportunity to appear and the right to participate
in a meaningful manner. "376
3. Retain the Current Time Period for Challenging Finalized Adoptions
Assuring the finality of adoptions (as well as protecting children from
unnecessary separation from their original parents) is one of the primary
37 7
purposes of North Carolina's adoption scheme. At some point, a child's
interest in a permanent home has to trump her putative father's constitutional
rights, whether inchoate or fundamental.378 In these heart-wrenching cases
involving adoptions accomplished by fraud, everyone struggles with the
question, ".. . is the child better off remaining with the adoptive parent who
is a biological stranger, or being transferred to the biological parent who is a
psychological stranger?" 379 One of the ways to address this concern is to
statutorily set some outer time limit for attacking a finalized adoption
regardless of the fraud perpetrated.
In most states, those periods of time range from six months to one
year.380 Nebraska and the Indian Child Welfare Act allow challenges up to
381
two years after the adoption order has been entered. New York permits a
court to vacate or set aside an order of adoption based on fraud, newly
discovered evidence, or other sufficient cause, without stating a definite time

375. In re S.D.W., 745 S.E.2d at 50.
376. Bailey v. Campbell, 862 P.2d 461, 469 (Okla. 1991); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545,
552 (1965) (opportunity to be heard must be "granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner").
377. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-1-100 (2017).
378. Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, observed, "The law's concept of the family
rests on a presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity
for judgment required for making life's difficult decisions. More important, historically it has
recognized that natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interest of their children."
Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (citing 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *447;
2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW *190).

379. Hollinger, supra note 132.
380. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 25.23.140 (West 2019) (one year); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8123 (West 2019) (one year); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-5-214 (West 2019) (one year); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 918 (West 2019) (six months); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-310 (West 2019) (one
year); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.182 (West 2019) (one year); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 1263 (2019)
(one year); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-17-15 (West 2019) (six months); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-122
(West 2019) (one year); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 162.012 (West 2019) (six months).
381. NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-116 (West 2019); Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C.A.
§ 1913(d) (West 2019) (two years).
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limit. 382 The relevant provision directs the court to handle such a motion in
the same manner that a court of general jurisdiction would, that is, the
movant must use due diligence in seeking relief within a reasonable time or
else be barred by the defense of laches. 383 South Carolina has a similar
procedure allowing a party to file a motion to set aside an adoption decree
based on "extrinsic fraud" 384 within a reasonable time, but it cannot exceed
one year from the date of the adoption decree.3 ss However, the longer a child
is allowed to bond with his adoptive parents, the more devastating a change
in placement becomes. Thus, a short, definite time period would afford
greater protections to a child who has bonded with adoptive parents.
North Carolina currently allows a parent "whose consent or
relinquishment was obtained by fraud or duress" to move to set aside an
adoption within six months from the time the fraud or duress ought
reasonably to have been discovered."' However, In re Adoption of S.D. W
makes clear that this provision will currently not provide relief in instances
where a putative father was unaware of a pregnancy and birth - even because
of a mother's deceptive acts. It apparently does not apply in those instances
because there is no consent or relinquishment to declare void. The reasoning
appears to be that a father who has had sex has had notice, so where he fails
to afterward develop a relationship with his child (because he does not know
about his child), obviously his consent is not necessary. This highlights the
inadequacy of North Carolina's current law and demonstrates why North
Carolina needs a putative father registry.
Assuming the other safeguards discussed herein are enacted, there
should be a short period of limitation set (six months or less) after any final
decree of adoption is ordered, within which a putative father must move to
set aside the fraudulent adoption or forever lose his claim. This provision
should stand alone and should not be couched in terms of the father's consent
being obtained by fraud or duress. A putative father who has been deceived
as to the facts of the pregnancy and existence of a child cannot give consent.
Such a statute of limitation would ensure the proper balancing of an innocent
putative father's constitutionally mandated opportunity and an innocent

child's right to stability and finality of family.
4.

Provide the Adoption Scheme with the Constitutional Safeguards
Found in the Termination Scheme

The ostensible reason for the disparate treatment of fathers in
termination versus adoption actions is that a father in a termination action
has already been recognized by the state as having a constitutionally
protected interest in the care, custody and control of his child, while the
putative father in an adoption action merely has an "inchoate" right to pursue
382. N.Y. DOM. REL. § 114(3) and cmt. (LexisNexis 2019).

383. Id.
384. S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-9-770 (2019).
385. S.C. R. Civ. P. 60 (2019).
386.
N.C. and
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STAT. § 48-2-607
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387
This position seems to have little
a constitutionally protected interest.
merit. Lehr recognized that a putative father has a constitutionally protected
opportunity to form a relationship with his child, if not a full-blown,
fundamental right. 388 Why should that be enough to give an unwed father in
a termination proceeding greater safeguards than an unwed father in an
adoption proceeding? Both actions involve a parent and his child. Both
actions can result in the severance of the bonds between the parent and child.
Both actions involve state action - either by a state agency or through
enforcement of a private party's claim. Perhaps the only real difference
among these two actions is the relationship between the child and the parent:
Is it somehow more constitutional to deny an ignorant parent the opportunity
to form a bond with his child (in an adoption) than to sever an abusive or
neglectful parent's bond with his child (in a termination proceeding)?
Another reason for this disparate treatment might be that in the case of
adoptions, there is an identifiable couple ready with an open heart and open
home. In contrast, after a termination action, children may be entered into
389
the foster care system with no prospect for a permanent placement.
However, "[w]e must remember that the purpose of an adoption is to provide
390
Thus, the legislature should
a home for a child, not a child for a home."
strongly consider imposing the same heightened constitutional safeguards
found in termination proceedings to adoption proceedings.391

Include Exercisable Penalties for Birth Mother or Agency Perjury
In North Carolina, committing perjury during sworn proceedings or on
392
sworn affidavits is punishable as a Class F felony, punishable by 10-41
393
To strongly deter birth mothers and
months of incarceration and a fine.
adoption agencies from affirmatively and falsely stating that they are
unaware of either the birth father's identity or whereabouts, the legislature
should consider adding a provision in the adoption code that such perjury
will be prosecuted. Some exceptions to this provision might also be included,
for example, when the perjuring party either: (1) recants the lie prior to the
finalization of the adoption; or (2) can prove a compelling justification for
5.

387. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 265 (1983).
388. Id. at 263.
389. As of September 30, 2017, there were almost 3,000 children in foster care in North
Carolina awaiting adoption. U.S. Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs., Child Welfare Outcomes Report
Data by State, CHILDREN'S BUREAU, https://cwoutcomes.acf.hhs.gov/cwodatasite/pdf/
north%20carolina.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2019).
390. In re Petition of Doe, 638 N.E.2d 181, 190 (Ill. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 994 (1994)
(Justice Heiple's supplemental opinion in the famous "Baby Richard" case).
391. See generally Baylee J. Hapeman, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 48-3-601 and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B1111: A PutativeFather'sRight to Be a Father, 41 CAMPBELL L. REv. 201 (2019) for a proposal
to add "catch-all clauses" to the termination and adoption schemes that would allow a court to
inquire into whether a putative father had knowledge of his child before then holding a best interest
hearing to determine whether the adoption should proceed.
392. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-209 (2017).
393. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.17 (2017).
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the deception (e.g., a putative father's domestic violence or other criminal
acts).
VII.

CONCLUSION

Absent a putative father registry, a state's statutory adoption and
termination schemes should properly view the father's commitment in light
of both his knowledge of the pregnancy and a mother's efforts to thwart his
legal rights. North Carolina's adoption scheme fails to do this. By failing to
offer putative fathers an alternative means to establish a significant
relationship with their children when a mother engages in deceptive acts, the
State of North Carolina unjustifiably infringes on putative fathers'
constitutionally mandated opportunity to establish a significant parent-child
relationship.
North Carolina's current adoption scheme, insofar as it deprives a
putative father of a mechanism - one within his sole control and one that
cannot be thwarted by a deceptive mother - to "grasp the opportunity to
develop a relationship with his child,""'4 is procedurally inadequate. As
Justice Stevens in Lehr observed, " ... if qualification for notice were
beyond the control of an interested putative father, it might be thought
procedurally inadequate."395 The current scheme removes the qualification
for notice beyond a putative father's control when it essentially gives
deceptive mothers unilateral power to bar a father from ever grasping that
opportunity.
Therefore, North Carolina's legislature should, at a minimum,
promulgate a putative father registry that provides the putative father with a
unilateral mechanism to receive qualification for notice of adoption
proceedings. Moreover, the registry should allow putative fathers to register
as early as their first sexual encounter, without regard for knowledge of
whether they have actually sired a child. The registry should be wellpublicized and inclusive.
In addition, to pass constitutional muster, North Carolina's General
Assembly should consider providing meaningful impossibility exceptions to
the adoption code, tolling the time period for registration, and/or waiving
strict compliance with the registry. It should continue to bar challenges after
an adoption has been finalized or at some short time period thereafter. It
should also provide some of the same safeguards to putative fathers in
adoption proceedings as it currently does in termination proceedings, such
as giving the putative father a right to counsel, holding a hearing to determine
when he should have discovered the existence of his child and what
affirmative steps he took to assume parental responsibility, or shifting the
burden to petitioners to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the
father assumed no parental responsibility despite having the knowledge and
means to do so. Finally, it should consider constructing some mandatory
394. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262.

264. Scholarship Digital Archives, 2020
Id. at and
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penalties for fraud and perjury, with appropriate exceptions, that will deter
deceptive conduct.
It is not enough that children are ready for adoption, or that it is in their
best interest to be adopted. They must first be available. The child's interest
in stability, and the adoptive parents' interest in finality can best be met
where an interested, putative father who has been deceived is afforded some
unilateral action to make himself known. Fairness and equality for every
interested party can be achieved only when a putative father's
constitutionally mandated opportunity to develop a relationship with his
child has been fully protected.
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